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This year will represent a turning point for pre-paredness and homeland security in the
United States. With Michael Chertoff firmly in
place and making his own mark as the new Secre-
tary of Homeland Security, the anticipated re-au-
thorization of the federal bioterrorism bill and
many other new perspectives and strategies on the
table, changes are likely to be seen across the
board. That’s a good thing and the new Secretary
seems off to a strong start. The nation clearly
needs more resources and smarter strategies if we
are to make the progress we need. The fact is that
four years after the attacks of September 11, 2001,
the country remains far less prepared for terrorism
and catastrophic disaster than we should be.
How do we explain this seeming paradox? In ef-
fect, we live in the most technologically advanced,
politically powerful and wealthy nation on earth,
yet we are still struggling to secure our borders,
protect our ports and public transportation systems
and sufficiently enhance our public health systems
against the persistent threat of terrorism.
Take the case of relevant technologies that are es-
sential to ensure effective protection of the home-
land. An article in the New York Times last year
detailed the extraordinary lack of quality and con-
sistency that literally undermines local efforts to
make substantive progress in many areas of pre-
paredness planning. A good example is what is
happening with respect to our ability to protect
communities from the possibility of terrorists
transporting and detonating a so-called “dirty
bomb” - or Radiological Dispersal Device. While
thousands of radiation detectors have been distrib-
uted strategically throughout many U.S. cities,
high levels of sensitivity have resulted in many
“false alarms”.
The problem is that detectors may be set off by in-
nocent sources of radiation, say nuclear material
for medical imaging procedures. But the alarms
trigger responses geared to managing a potential
dirty bomb threat. Repeated mobilization of forces
to deal with these situations exhausts money and
morale. It is not unreasonable to expect that such
challenges would have already been met. But it
also doesn’t make sense that each local jurisdic-
tion operating in relative isolation, needs to do its
own R & D. Developing and testing new technolo-
gies, establishing best practices based on
replicable data analysis should be done nationally.
Radiation detection needs should be the same in
Omaha as they are in Seattle or Chicago. We don’t
have the resources - or the time - to explore tech-
nological applications in potentially hundreds of
localities.
Even in the case of understanding and meeting
needs among first responder agencies, much of
what is being done is shockingly random. In any
given State, for instance, fire districts are using
designated Homeland Security funds for widely
variant purposes. One particular district may de-
cide to use these dollars to purchase personal pro-
tective equipment; an adjacent district may go for
a new truck, communication equipment or refur-
bishing the firehouse. None of these decisions may
have any relevancy to a master response plan for a
region. Such a master plan, in fact, is not likely to
even exist. Consequently, stations and districts are
on their own, a situation that causes legitimate
concern about the real level of disaster readiness in
many communities.
Public Health Preparedness and
Response: Where We Stand
What about the U.S. health and public health sys-
tems? This represents one sector at center stage in
the strategic plan to prepare the nation for uncon-
ventional attacks by international forces bent on
taking lives and demoralizing the country as a
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whole. By the end of last year, the U.S. had spent
approximately $20 billion since 2001 on the public
health and hospital systems, including essential re-
search.
So what do we have to show for this investment?
Do we have the ability to recognize and diagnose a
bioterror attack at the earliest possible stage? Do
we have a sufficient stockpile of vaccines or treat-
ments against the top six or eight potential
bioweapons? Do we have a trained workforce of
first responders and health care professionals suffi-
cient to meet the needs of mass casualties of an at-
tack with virulent biological weapons? Can we
depend on our capacity to “surge up” in the face of
dramatically expanded emergency needs for hospi-
tal beds and ventilators? Sad to say, to date the an-
swer to these questions is essentially either
“maybe” or “no.” Hardly good enough.
A new generation of “public health disaster mod-
elers” in and out of government have been looking
at the relationship among timing of diagnosing a
bioterror attack, ramping up of a significant re-
sponse and fatality rates. No surprises here. The
earlier we determine that there is a “bio event”,
understand the specific agent involved and get re-
sponse protocols in place, the more lives will be
saved. So how is early diagnosis, the first essential
step, ensured?
The answer is not entirely clear. One school of
thought suggests that a comprehensive syndromic
surveillance system is key. Many localities have
begun this process by monitoring the frequency of
syndrome patterns among patients showing up at
hospitals or medical offices. But this is far from a
reality in most communities throughout the U.S.
And those that are engaged in syndromic surveil-
lance do not necessarily share the same approach,
criteria or protocols. It is also true, however, that
there are some experts who do not believe that this
approach is best, preferring instead to focus on
training clinicians to be on high alert for a particu-
lar constellation of symptoms and medical find-
ings that might suggest a bioterror agent at work.
Still others promote monitoring sales of over the
counter medicines for treating respiratory or intes-
tinal symptoms or, even, monitoring the volume of
sewage in treatment plants as a way of assessing
new onset of widespread diarrheal disease.
What’s missing is federal direction, backed up by
credible research, that tells every community what
is recommended and provides the resources neces-
sary to implement the plan. We have not estab-
lished a system of developing best practices. This
is true for bioterror surveillance, and almost every
other aspect of preparedness or response as well.
What about challenges like ensuring sufficient
“surge capacity” in the nation’s health and hospital
systems in the event of a mass casualty event?
This concept refers to the ability to rapidly make
available needed beds, equipment, personnel to
treat very large numbers of victims in a nuclear,
chemical or biological attack. I remember touring
communities throughout New York State just
weeks after 9/11. I had joined Senator Hillary
Rodham Clinton on a fact-finding tour and we
were interested in hearing what concerns and is-
sues were on people’s minds. We also tried to get
a sense of how local hospitals might respond to an
acute need to treat thousands of patients affected
by an attack with unconventional weapons.
It was the same in every community. There was no
plan, no idea of what would actually happen if the
medical resources in a particular city were stressed
by such an event. But that was four years ago. The
problem is that, on many of these issues, we have
made little progress, even four years later. Most
communities could not and cannot handle an
acute, substantial surge of very sick people need-
ing rapid evaluation, aggressive treatment and ac-
cess to significant hospital resources and expertise.
Part of the problem is money. Many U.S. hospitals
are struggling to keep financially afloat. They are
being squeezed by increasing demand, reduced re-
imbursements and increased costs of doing busi-
ness. So, after 9/11 when hospitals were urged to
“prepare for terrorism and major disasters”, few
had the resource or motivation to do so. Although
the federal government provides some funding,
primarily through the federal Health Resources
and Services Administration (HRSA), as well as
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
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(CDC), this is a fraction of what is actually
needed. The American Hospital Association esti-
mates that the nation’s 5,000 hospitals may need
as much as $20 billion annually to implement and
sustain true preparedness. Indeed, the actual
amount of HRSA funds available for this purpose
each year is less than $0.5 billion.
But money is only part of the problem. A larger
concern may be a relative paucity of federal direc-
tion as to how preparedness goals should be set for
individual hospitals or communities. What money
does arrive, generally comes without functional
guidelines with respect to describing what is ex-
pected from any given institution in terms of disas-
ter preparedness. And for potentially
understandable reasons, funds flow through states
to local jurisdictions. What’s missing though are
robust processes for organizing true regional plan-
ning. A chemical release, nuclear incident or bio-
logical attack will obviously not respect political
or geographic borders.
But who determines how resources and responses
will be coordinated and applied across state lines?
Of course, “meetings are held” among bordering
communities, some even developing preliminary
plans for handling such contingencies. But, as of
now, few regions have developed dependable, ap-
propriately funded working protocols for how
cross-jurisdictional mass casualty events will actu-
ally be managed. As of this writing, for instance,
important challenges are just being explored in ef-
forts to meet regional emergency planning needs.
Open questions include difficult issues, such as the
role of the military in responding to catastrophic
events.
So what is to be done? How does a diverse, demo-
cratic society go from business as usual to a nation
ready to prevent and respond to threats that just
four years ago were simply not on the radar
screens of most political leaders or the public at
large. True, within government, and particularly
within the military, there has long been a core of
experts concerned about and working on the na-
tion’s vulnerability to attacks from foreign or do-
mestic terrorists using mass casualty,
unconventional weapons. Early incidents in the
U.S., from the Oklahoma City bombing to the
1993 attack on the World Trade Center in New
York, certainly reinforced a need to continue this
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work. But in terms of full-scale engagement of
government and significant awareness of vulnera-
bility among the public, September 11, 2001 was
the real turning point.
Systemic Challenges: Many Still Unmet
Homeland Security dollars are filtered from the
federal government to states and then to communi-
ties. Although formal directives from the White
House have addressed issues of organizational and
command structure, as well as specific planning
goals for terrorism preparedness (Homeland Secu-
rity Presidential Directives 5 and 8, in particular),
this kind of guidance is far from implemented in
the States and among community planners. That
said, Secretary Chertoff clearly seems to be on the
right track. The Department of Homeland Security
is emphasizing the idea of planning around
threat-based scenarios with strong federal guid-
ance. Priority is being given to the prevention of
and response planning for catastrophic events re-
sulting from deployment of so-called “weapons of
mass destruction.”
In theory, this is where we should be headed. But
there are at least three principle barriers to assur-
ing that sufficient progress is actually made in a
relatively timely manner. First is the question of
resources. Are we investing enough money in
Homeland Security to ensure the outcomes we de-
sire? That is actually difficult to know. The fact is
that in the absence of really defining what we
mean by “prepared” and without establishing mea-
surable benchmarks for getting to an adequate
state of readiness, how can we possibly know how
much it will cost?
Secondly, there seems to be a general national
confusion about the roles and responsibilities of
local versus state versus federal agencies in pre-
paring for or responding to major disasters. I am
not referring to some of the thorny legal, jurisdic-
tional questions which will eventually be worked
out. More germane in the immediate sense are
mundane questions related to the development of
best practices, establishing standards for surge ca-
pacity or personal protective gear or training first
responders and so forth. Some of these issues are
best solved by local authorities who know their
own communities and the key players who will ac-
tually need to function effectively in a major emer-
gency. But other issues, including standards of
practice, training protocols, testing of new equip-
ment to mention just a few, do not need to be
re-invented in communities or even among states.
Finally, the U.S. faces a profound structural, sys-
temic reality as it struggles to get “prepared” for
terrorism in the 21st Century. For decades now,
the nation has moved further and further along a
process of moving decision-making authority from
the federal government to the individual States -
and from there to the local jurisdictions. Without
judging this inexorable movement to more and
more local control of resources and authority, it is
safe to say that the outcome of this process may
not make it easy to develop a true state of appro-
priate national readiness for the threats we face in
a post-9/11 world.
We are presumably in a “war against terrorism” or
at least have a high priority national commitment
to make the homeland as secure as it can be with-
out fundamentally changing the kind of society in
which we live. If so, this is hardly an effort that
can be dispersed among the states without a
strong, centralized command structure. We need
defined goals, clear benchmarks and true account-
ability with respect to dollars spent and deliver-
ables met. Otherwise, America will continue to
find itself floundering in a world which, it seems,
becomes more fragile and dangerous with every
passing year.
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